

Guidance on safety integrity level determination  
for safety instrumented systems in support of  
IEC 61511

GUIDANCE ON SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL DETERMINATION  
FOR SAFETY INSTRUMENTED SYSTEMS IN SUPPORT OF IEC 61511

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## FOREWORD

Most process plants are controlled by complex process control systems; there is increasing dependence on safety instrumented systems (SISs) to carry out safety instrumented functions (SIFs). Process industry incidents, such as those occurring at petroleum refineries and bulk storage facilities, have focused attention on the design and maintenance of functional safety for SISs to ensure that the target risk levels (e.g. tolerable) are to be achieved.

After applying inherently safer design (ISD) principles to the fundamental process plant design, residual process plant hazards should be properly controlled and have effective risk reduction measures (RRMs) in place to achieve target risk levels. Equipment on the process plant and the process control system may provide some risk reduction, but these do not usually provide sufficient control for all the identified hazardous events. Consequently, to achieve target risk levels, and as part of a balanced approach to risk reduction, additional RRM may be necessary. Such RRM could include SISs to carry out SIFs. These are protection layers (PLs) that are intended to detect abnormal conditions on the process plant and prevent the hazardous event (PL(prevention)), or to mitigate the consequences of the hazardous event (PL(mitigation)). SISs comprise electrical, electronic or programmable electronic systems. SIL determination therefore contributes to defining RRM, and its findings should be part of a demonstration of safe operation to competent authorities.

The objective of safety integrity level (SIL) determination is, for a specific hazardous event, to:

- Determine whether it is necessary to employ a SIS, to carry out a specific SIF, where there is a shortfall in the risk reduction already achieved by RRM to meet a target risk.
- Determine the SIL of the SIF where it has been determined that there is a shortfall in the risk reduction needed to meet the target risk.

This technical publication supports practical application of the following clauses of IEC 61511-1:

- clause 8 Process [hazard and risk assessment] H&RA, and
- clause 9 Allocation of safety functions to protection layers.

It does so by providing guidance on:

- SIL determination of SIFs associated with SISs within the scope of IEC 61511.
- Identifying the SIFs to be carried out by one or more SISs.
- Illustrating several SIL determination methods available for ensuring that an appropriate SIL is selected for each SIF.
- The team-based workshop methodology.
- Setting a target risk comprising target harmful event frequencies for the specified consequences (e.g. safety and environment).
- Justifying the basis on which the target harmful event frequencies for specified consequences are set.
- Having a rational basis for claims made for the risk levels that are achieved.
- Ensuring that the assumptions relating to the risk reduction parameters that impact on the amount of risk reduction that is being claimed for a particular PL are based on robust evidence and are managed throughout the safety life cycle of the process plant.

Guidance is provided on some key principles and requirements for effective functional safety management (FSM), including:

- Setting a target risk comprising target harmful event frequencies for the specified consequences (e.g. safety and environment).
- Justifying the basis on which the target harmful event frequencies for specified consequences are set.
- Having a rational basis for claims made for the risk levels that are achieved.
- Ensuring that the assumptions relating to the risk reduction parameters that impact on the amount of risk reduction that is being claimed for a particular PL are based on robust evidence and are managed throughout the life of the process plant.

The focus of this technical publication is safety and environmental risk, but the guidance may also be used for other risks (e.g. as a basis for asset protection). Excluded from the scope is guidance on other key steps of the SIS safety life cycle, from SIS design and engineering through installation and commissioning to decommissioning. For guidance on taking forward the findings of SIL determination, see *EI Guidance on achievement, operation and maintenance of functional safety employing safety instrumented systems in support of IEC 61511*.

The intended applications of this technical publication are:

- the process industry sectors (e.g. nuclear processing, offshore and onshore oil and gas sectors, and the chemical manufacturing industry);
- SIFs operating in any mode of operation (i.e. low demand, high demand or continuous mode), and
- new process plant design, but also legacy systems where modifications are being considered or undertaken.

This technical publication should be relevant to:

- Persons who require a basic understanding of the key concepts and terminology of SIL determination, e.g. to make them competent 'intelligent customers';
- Persons who need to have a comprehensive understanding of SIL determination;
- Persons who wish to further develop their competence in the key technical concepts, and
- Senior managers who have responsibility for functional safety.

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Dr Mark Scanlon managed the technical development project.

# 1 INTRODUCTION, SCOPE AND APPLICATION

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Most process plants are controlled by complex process control systems; there is increasing dependence on safety instrumented systems (SISs) to carry out safety instrumented functions (SIFs).

After applying inherently safer design (ISD) principles to the fundamental process plant design to eliminate hazards as the first priority, residual process plant hazards should be properly controlled and have effective risk reduction measures (RRMs) in place to achieve target risk levels. Equipment on the process plant and the process control system may provide some risk reduction, but these do not usually provide sufficient control for all the identified hazardous events. Consequently, to achieve target risk levels, and as part of a balanced approach to risk reduction, additional RRM s may be necessary. Such RRM s could include SISs to carry out SIFs. These are protection layers (PLs) that are intended to detect abnormal conditions on the process plant and prevent the hazardous event (PL(prevention)), or to mitigate the consequences of the hazardous event (PL(mitigation)). SISs comprise electrical, electronic or programmable electronic systems.

To achieve target risk levels, the approach should involve (in order of priority):

- Applying ISD principles (also in order of priority):
  - elimination of hazards, and
  - control and minimisation of risk at source using physical engineering controls (e.g. by increasing separation distances).
- Providing PLs (prevention) that reduce the specific hazardous event frequency (HEF). These may include systems and functions that are intended to detect abnormal conditions on the process plant and prevent the hazardous event.
- Providing PLs (mitigation) that mitigate the consequence of the specific hazardous event. These may include systems and functions that are intended to mitigate the consequences of the hazardous event.

For a specific hazardous event, the objective of SIL determination is to:

- Determine whether it is necessary to employ a SIS to carry out a specific SIF, where there is a shortfall in the risk reduction already achieved by RRM s to meet a target risk.
- Determine the SIL of the SIF where it has been determined that there is a shortfall in the risk reduction needed to meet the target risk.

An example of a hazardous event is 'Rupture of pressure vessel and release of flammable gas at high pressure leading to an extensive gas cloud.'

Whilst the guidance provided in this technical publication relates to the required performance of the SIFs to be implemented by PLs to prevent hazardous events or to mitigate the consequences of hazardous events, selecting SIFs and determining their performance requirements should be part of a balanced approach to risk reduction.